

IT'S NOT ONLY CHINA: JAPAN AND KOREA'S GROWING ROLES IN CENTRAL ASIA

A CASPIAN POLICY CENTER POLICY BRIEF

AUGUST 2021

CPC



**CASPIAN
POLICY
CENTER**

ABOUT US

The Caspian Policy Center (CPC) is an independent, nonprofit research think tank based in Washington D.C. Economic, political, energy, and security issues of the Caspian region constitute the central research focus of the Center.

CPC aims at becoming a primary research and debate platform in the Caspian region with relevant publications, events, projects, and media productions to nurture a comprehensive understanding of the intertwined affairs of the Caspian region.

With an inclusive, scholarly, and innovative approach, the Caspian Policy Center presents a platform where diverse voices from academia, business, and policy world from both the region and the nation's capital interact to produce distinct ideas and insights to the outstanding issues of the Caspian region.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Ambassador (Ret.) Robert F. Cekuta **Author**

Ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan (2015 – 2018), Bob Cekuta has long and extensive experience as a top-level U.S. diplomat. Amb. Cekuta's positions in the State Department included Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities. His overseas postings included the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Tokyo where he oversaw the full range of economic, commercial, nonproliferation, and scientific relations. In addition, Amb. Cekuta was Deputy Chief of Mission in Albania and held positions in Vienna, Baghdad, Kabul, Johannesburg, and Sana'a, Yemen.



Dante Schulz **Author**

Dante Schulz is a Research Assistant with the Caspian Policy Center's Energy and Economy Program. He is a senior at The George Washington University studying international affairs and history with a focus on Asia. He is interested in studying the implications of China's increasing presence on the economic, political, and security affairs of the Greater Caspian Region. Dante also currently serves as the president of the Elliott School for International Affairs' only gender-inclusive honor society and the senior video editor for his university's independently run student newspaper.



Jeremy Cohen **Editor**

Jeremy Cohen serves as the Programs Assistant at the Caspian Policy Center. He completed his B.S. at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service with honors in International History and a minor in Russian. Cohen studied ethnic policy and conflict in Eurasia during the imperial and Soviet periods of Russian history, and Russo-British relations in nineteenth-century Central Asia. At CPC, he pursues his interest in the Caspian region's status as a political and economic crossroads both today and throughout history. He has worked previously as an intern at the U.S. Embassies in Astana (Nur-Sultan) and Kyiv, and has organized non-profit educational programming in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Introduction

Japan and the Republic of Korea have important, long-standing relations with Central Asia that could be developed further to yield political as well as economic benefits. These relations are not always given the attention they are due, including by Washington, but this situation ought to be rectified for several reasons. In addition to the fact that both South Korea and Japan are leading world economies with the capacity to support Central Asia's development, both are also close treaty allies of the United States sharing many of Washington's concerns about the evolving global geostrategic picture. This reality can be especially important given China's increasingly aggressive foreign policy in Central Asia, the growing unease among Central Asian publics over Chinese actions and intentions, and the shifts in Central Asia and the Greater Caspian region that may come with the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan.

East Asian countries are accelerating their involvement in Central Asian affairs as they compete with one another to assert a role in the region and to address issues closer to home. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is certainly a prime leitmotif in the thinking in Central Asia, Washington, and other capitals' thinking about the region. However, in recent years both Japan and South Korea have boosted their presence in the region through cultural exchange programs, investments and other business engagement, high-level visits, and enhanced trade agreements. Thus, even if most public and policy-maker attention regarding East Asia and its present and potential role in the five Central Asian republics seems focused on the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese activities, greater attention should be given to South Korea and Japan and their potential role in the goals of stability, economic growth, and protecting the sovereignty and independence of Central Asian states.

China's Higher Profile Activities and the Growing Unease that Results

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to diversify China's trade connections and to boost China's political as well as economic influence by reviving the ancient Silk Road routes through a series of development and investment projects stretching from East Asia through Europe.¹ Central Asia, along with countries in the Caucasus and elsewhere, embraced the influx of Chinese investment projects spurring regional and local economic growth. However, there is growing uneasiness towards China brewing in the region that, along with Beijing's more competitive international stance and apprehensions in Washington and other capitals over Chinese intentions, is leading to a new dynamic.

China is eager to tap into the Greater Caspian Region's lucrative hydrocarbon and mineral resource extraction potential as well as to utilize the area to diversify global transport links. China's large population and robust industrial growth have made it the world's largest energy consumer.² Central Asia's vast hydrocarbon resource reserves and proximity are important factors in China's engagement with the region. Turkmen

natural gas exports to China increased from 3.5 bcm in 2010 to 33.2 bcm in 2019 while Turkmenistan's natural gas sales to Russia dropped from 10.7 bcm in 2010 to only 1 bcm in 2019.³ China's overall demand for natural gas is expected to double by 2035, a positive forecast for Central Asian governments looking for foreign exchange and income for governments' budgets and national development.


While governments have been eager to embrace Chinese investment, public opinion has faltered and Sinophobia has flared. The percentage of people in Central Asia expressing concern about China's economic influence rose over the past year with anti-Chinese protests and clashes becoming more frequent. In total, there were 98 recorded anti-China demonstrations spanning Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan between January 2017 and mid-2020.

In February 2020, hundreds of people in Kyrgyzstan protested the construction of a \$280 million logistics center financed by a Chinese company, causing the company to withdraw from the country.⁴ Moreover, clashes between workers and villagers at a Chinese-owned gold mine in Kyrgyzstan halted operations.⁵ Kyrgyz protesters have called for the expulsion of foreigners, but the influx seems to be mostly short-term. In 2018, 35,215 Chinese citizens entered Kyrgyzstan, primarily to work on BRI projects.⁶ Furthermore, only 268 people from China acquired Kyrgyz citizenship from 2010–2018, of whom all but six were ethnic Kyrgyz. Frequent claims erupt that Chinese workers are marrying Kyrgyz women, but only 60 such marriages were recorded between 2010 and 2018.⁷

In addition, even as Central Asian authorities accept – and seek – Chinese investment, many of their countries' citizens have developed negative attitudes towards China because of its treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim and Turkic ethnic groups. In 2018, about 150 Kyrgyz protested in Bishkek to demand Beijing explain the reasons behind the detention of ethnic Kyrgyz in internment camps.⁸ Protesters also called for the Kyrgyz Republic's government to expel foreigners residing in the country illegally in retaliation, including Chinese nationals. Similarly, in 2016, widespread protests erupted in Kazakhstan over proposed legislation that would allow foreigners to rent agricultural land for the first time in 25 years. Protesters argued that it would leave Kazakhstan susceptible to China. One protester in Aktobe, Kazakhstan shouted, "We can't give land to the Chinese. If they come, then they won't leave!"⁹

Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's substantial debt with China is frequently flagged as problematic. Overall, 23 of the 68 countries involved in BRI projects have a high-risk debt ratio, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.¹⁰ In 2020, China's Export-Import Bank held about 43.4 percent of Kyrgyzstan's and 36.6 percent of Tajikistan's debt.¹¹ Analysts caution that China is initiating debt diplomacy in Central Asia. Taking advantage of the situation, for example, China would be able to use Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's growing debt and their inability to repay on schedule to sway their domestic and foreign policies in favor of Beijing.¹²

Percentage of Total External Public Debt Owed to Export-Import Bank of China



SOURCE: EURASIANET

CPC CASPIAN
POLICY
CENTER

Another concern is that Chinese investment projects do not do enough to stimulate local economies. Chinese projects in Kyrgyzstan reserve 70 percent of available jobs for Chinese engineers and technicians, while only 30 percent of jobs are available for local hires.¹³

However, as ethnic solidarity and skepticism of the Chinese government spur anti-Chinese sentiment, governments seek to stifle, or at least to keep in check, these feelings. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan attempted to muzzle any anti-Chinese protests over the detention of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Still, reports of detentions have alarmed many in Central Asia and Kazakhstani students enrolled in Chinese universities have said they felt unsafe after Kazakhstani citizens were arrested when transiting in Xinjiang.¹⁴ Moreover, there are growing tensions reported between Chinese and Uzbek business traders who are engaging with one another for the first time since President Mirziyoyev's economic liberalization reforms.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the governments in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have managed to minimize anti-Chinese rhetoric.



Protesters gather in Almaty, Kazakhstan to oppose the construction of Chinese factories | Pavel Mikheyev/Reuters

South Korea's Emerging Role

While the western press and governments focus on China's investment and other engagement in Central Asia, China is not—and has not been—the only East Asian country looking to engage in the region. South Korea has a vested historical interest in Central Asia and a significant level of economic involvement.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) experienced one of the most dramatic, rapid economic developments of the twentieth century. The country has the fourth largest GDP in Asia and the 10th in the world. Its GDP has also experienced a steady increase each year with only a minor setback after the 1998 Asian financial crisis.¹⁷ The IMF projects South Korea to be one of only seven members of the G20 economies to see its economy back at pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021. South Korea's economy contracted only minimally due to the pandemic and ranked third highest among G20 members in 2020 in terms of economic performance, following only China and Turkey.¹⁸ South Korea's nominal GDP outstrips Russia's and given its economic performance during the pandemic, seems it could be in an optimal position to supply much-needed capital. Bolstering trade and other ties with the ROK can contribute to Central Asia's economies.

South Korea's cultural ties to Central Asia, moreover, offer a unique opportunity to bolster links with the region's republics. Under Stalin, Soviet authorities deported about 180,000

ethnic Koreans from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia. These forced migrants are known as the Koryo-Saram people.¹⁹ Many Koreans integrated into Central Asian societies, becoming middle class business owners and entrepreneurs. The substantial Korean diaspora in Central Asia can support South Korea's attempts to become a more meaningful regional partner.

Most Central Asian countries are highly remittance dependent. The primary destination for a large majority of seasonal migrants is Russia. However, trends indicate South Korea is becoming an attractive destination for Central Asians looking to work abroad. In 2008, only three ethnic Koreans from Central Asia arrived in South Korea on long-term work visas. This number jumped to 3,625 ethnic Koreans by 2017. Furthermore, about 12,885 ethnic Koreans from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan moved to South Korea between 2007 and 2017. Ethnic Koreans from Central Asia contribute to the economies of both South Korea and their home countries in Central Asia. Remittances sent back to Kazakhstan from South Korea spiked from \$1.7 million in 2012 to over \$104 million in 2018. Similarly, the value of remittances from South Korea to Uzbekistan increased from \$49 million in 2016 to over \$108 million by 2018.²⁰ The greater presence of those with Central Asian upbringings in South Korea might also increase the attractiveness of the country as a point of destination for Central Asian migrant workers without Korean heritage.

The noticeable jumps in Central Asians moving to South Korea for work can be attributed to South Korea's economy and liberalization of its immigration policies. In 2004, South Korea passed legislation that allowed foreign nationals of Korean heritage to live and work in the country. In addition, South Korea signed bilateral agreements with 16 countries, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to recruit workers. Russian and Kazakhstani citizens also enjoy a visa-free regime to work in South Korea.²¹ Some workers have said living and working conditions are better in South Korea than in Russia and that they face less discrimination. As a result, Central Asian neighborhoods are popping up around Seoul and other major




Many businesses in predominantly Central Asian neighborhoods in Seoul, South Korea cater to the growing Eurasian diaspora population | Yan Matusevich/Eurasianet

cities, such as Dongdaemun, where many store signs are written in Cyrillic.²²

Trade between South Korea and Central Asia has also increased. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are South Korea's second and third largest trading partners among developing countries in Europe and Central Asia.²³ South Korea's foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also exceeded \$7 billion in 2020.

Furthering these trends, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has adopted the New Northern Policy that seeks to boost South Korea's engagement with Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.²⁴ President Moon traveled to Central Asia in 2019 to demonstrate his intention.²⁵ He signed six memorandums of understanding with Turkmenistan, which stipulated South Korea would establish a branch of King Sejong Institute in Turkmenistan, would offer Korean classes in Turkmenistan's universities, and would improve the energy and infrastructure sectors of the country.²⁶ In Uzbekistan, President Moon announced that he would upgrade relations to a "special strategic partnership" from just a "strategic partnership." This arrangement included a package of deals worth \$12 billion.²⁷ Also,



President Moon during a visit with First President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan | Yelbasy/Press Service of the First President RK
Cover Photo credits: Korea.net

during this trip, President Moon endorsed Kazakhstan's Fresh Wind program and exhibited interest in collaborating on sustainability projects.²⁸

In alignment with his New Northern Policy, President Moon has advocated for the opening of the "Silk Road of Steel" with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. He hopes this effort can evolve into a South Korean BRI with less geopolitical baggage.²⁹ Many South Korean companies already operate in the region and South Korea's private sector engagement in the region is likely to continue growing.

South Korean companies have also shown significant interest in Central Asia's energy sector. South Korea sponsored investment deals surrounding the Balkash thermal power plant, Zhambyl oil and gas fields, and the Atyrau chemical plant in Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan attracted South Korean attention and financing when Hyundai partnered with Turkmengaz, LG, and Toyo of Japan to construct a \$3.4 billion gas-to-polymer plant in the Central Asian country. Moreover, Uzbekistan and South Korea initiated a joint working group to look at advancing bilateral agreements.³⁰ Lotte Chemical, a South Korean chemical firm, constructed the Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex in Uzbekistan, making it the largest Korean chemical firm in the Eurasia region.³¹ The experience and example of South Korean companies in the region's energy sector will foster closer working relationships between Central Asian countries and South Korea and can facilitate further economic engagement.


Japan – A Partner from the Start

Japan has sustained its position as one of the first countries to express enthusiasm for bolstering ties with Central Asia. Japan was often among the first to recognize and station diplomats in Central Asian countries when they gained their independence.³² The early jump to establish economic and political relations led to Japan employing its "Eurasian" or "Silk Road" Diplomacy concept to foster investment ties with Central Asia in the 1990s. These countries were highly receptive to Japanese investment; loans to the region reached \$2 billion by 2010. Japan's reputation as a reliable lender was important in it established the "Central Asia Plus Japan" dialogue in 2003. The dialogue has been used to discuss politics, intra-regional conflicts, socio-cultural exchanges, and business promotion.³³ Thus, Japan has been a consistent player in Central Asian affairs. Part of this engagement, though, stems from Japanese concerns about the economic and political activities of others, e.g., China, in the region.

Ties with Central Asia are important for other reasons as well. Japan is the world's largest consumer of rare earth metals, 93 percent of which are sourced from China. However, a territorial dispute resulting in the 2010 de facto embargo by China forced Japan to seek alternatives. Tokyo sees Central Asia as a viable supplier of rare earth metals and hopes to harness its close relationship to tap into those supplies³⁴ Since 2012, Japan has sealed numerous agreements to obtain rare earth minerals, including one granting it up

to 6,000 tons of rare earth minerals from the \$30 million Sareco facility in Kazakhstan. In 2013, Japan also declared its interest in engaging more with Kyrgyzstan to tap into the mountainous Central Asian country's lucrative rare earth mineral supply.³⁵

In other sectors, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov signed a Joint Declaration of Partnership in 2013, which included \$10 billion worth of Japanese corporate contracts with Turkmen gas and construction industries. In addition to Tokyo's participation in the Korean-Japanese consortium to build a polymer plant, billions of dollars of Japanese financing have underpinned Kawasaki's construction of a gas-to-gasoline plant, Mitsubishi's construction of a urea plant, and Sumitomo's construction of a power plant. Japan's consistent



Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (left) and Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (right) in Ashgabat in 2015 | Igor Sasin/Getty Images

interest in supporting regional development projects evinces its ability to serve as a key economic partner for the five Central Asian republics.

Again, Japan has an eye on the broader geostrategic situation in Eurasia and its engagement in Central Asia is influenced by concerns over Russian and Chinese intentions, as well as by a view to advancing Japanese firms' commercial interests. The Forward to the Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper) states Japan should stitch together countries of similar values across East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe to counterbalance China's expansion.³⁶ Japan was also an originator of the Blue Dot Network, a program supported by Australia and others to bring transparency to government and other contracting, thereby fighting corruption and pushing back

against untoward practices that could lead to debt traps and undermine growth in borrowers' economic growth and prosperity.

Central Asian countries have lauded Japan for its credibility and sustained interest in the region. Japanese investment has proven an effective diplomatic tool as have the series of regular top-level visits that showcase Japanese support, winning over the hearts of the Central Asian public and governments.³⁷

Still, and despite Tokyo's deep interest in engaging in the Central Asian region, observers argue Japanese private sector engagement could be stronger. Japanese firms have not always shown the same interest in building up Central Asia's energy sector as have South Korean or Chinese companies. For example, 18 Japanese companies were registered in Uzbekistan in 2016 compared to 410 South Korean companies and 480 Chinese companies.³⁸ Such private sector engagement, which is needed and sought after to help build the region's economies, is essential to fleshing out and making real the goals stated by leaders and diplomats.

Looking Forward

China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are three of the largest economies in the Asia-Pacific Region. At the same time, they are global economic rivals and have difficulties in their overall relationships with each other. In Central Asia, China's role has changed from a big, over-the-horizon partner, more important perhaps in trade than in other aspects of relations, to a major figure whose actions in Central Asia draw Washington's attention and can have direct impacts on the security and future of the countries in the region. China's Belt and Road Initiative, once seen as complementary to Washington's efforts to foster increased connectivity, and thus prosperity and stability in the region, is no longer looked upon as so benign. This reality is now a factor for Central Asian governments looking to pursue multi-vector approaches or foreign policies of neutrality. The differences among the three important East Asian states may be seen as an additional complication for Central Asian capitals already looking to balance off various competing international partners.

Nevertheless, while China's growing role in the region may capture press and policy-maker attention in Washington, Japan and the Republic of Korea remain important, experienced actors, whose actions can benefit the region as well as advance the overall stability, security, sovereignty, and prosperity of Central Asia.

In light of this situation Central Asian governments might consider:

1. Enhancing engagement with South Korea and Japan to broaden trade and

investment relations. Kazakhstan has adopted a multi-vector foreign policy to leverage its geopolitical position to counterbalance the interests of large regional neighbors.³⁹ A multi-vector economic policy can reinforce a multi-vector foreign policy. Other Central Asian countries can seek to mitigate their economic dependence on Russia and China by bolstering ties with South Korea and Japan. South Korea and Japan have shown interest in supporting the region's energy sectors and rapport in the energy sector can lead to partnerships in other areas.


2. Caution in accepting Chinese investment. It is unreasonable to think Central Asia should or will outright reject Chinese investment opportunities given the sheer size of China's economy, China's proximity, and the opportunities in Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, Central Asian countries must remain wary of falling into a debt trap with China. When Sri Lanka defaulted on payments for the Hambantota Port, China acquired the port and 15,000 acres of surrounding land for 99 years.⁴⁰ Central Asian countries must ensure that they avoid accepting loans that they cannot pay back. This point holds especially true for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

3. Support cultural programs, including with the Koryo-Saram community, as a bridge with South Korea. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Koreans are scattered throughout Central Asia but some have begun to both temporarily migrate and repatriate back to South Korea. Central Asia should foster cultural exchanges to bridge the Koryo-Saram community with South Korea. Doing so will benefit the economies of both Central Asia and South Korea and lead to closer bilateral relations.

4. Actively support private sector engagement from South Korea and Japan. Private sector engagement from China has been expanding, but domestic discomfort regarding Chinese companies along with the terms of the deals can be negative factors. South Korean companies have already established major operations in Central Asia as have a number of Japanese firms. Heightened private sector engagement will facilitate improved bilateral relations and open pathways to further engagement in other sectors.

At the same time, the United States should open or re-invigorate discussions with Tokyo and Seoul about Central Asia's economic and security picture. Japanese and Korean diplomats' experiences in and knowledge of the region could inform and enhance U.S. policies and engagement in the region. Moreover, encouraging increased Japanese and South Korean attention to and involvement in Central Asia may be particularly important as the region comes to terms with the security and other implications of the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan.

Conclusion



Japan and the Republic of Korea are eager to heighten economic engagement in the region and have demonstrated their support through numerous bilateral agreements, investment and other commercial commitments, and high-level visits. South Korea and Japan are likely to bolster their support for the five Central Asian republics as China ramps up its involvement in the region. The five Central Asian countries should take advantage of this engagement and Washington should work with Seoul and Tokyo as well, including in discussions regarding Central Asia's future security, prosperity, and stability.

Endnotes

- 1 Chatzky, A. & McBride, J. (2020, January 28). China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>
- 2 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2020, September 30). Country Analysis Executive Summary: China. EIA. Retrieved from <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN>.
- 3 Foley, R. (2021, March 24). Can Central Asian gas exports rely on China? Eurasianet. Retrieved from <https://eurasianet.org/analysis-can-central-asian-gas-exporters-rely-on-china>.
- 4 Reuters Staff. (2020, February 18). China -led \$280 million Kyrgyzstan project abandoned after protests. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-china-investment-protests/china-led-280-million-kyrgyzstan-project-abandoned-after-protests-idUSKBN20CIHA>.
- 5 Bacchi, U. (2019, August 7). Kyrgyzstan halts work at Chinese gold mine after clashes. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-protests-mining/kyrgyzstan-halts-work-at-chinese-gold-mine-after-clashes-idUSKCN1UX200>.
- 6 Wood, C. (2018, December 29). Why did Kyrgyz Stage a Protest Outside the Chinese Embassy? The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/why-did-kyrgyz-stage-a-protest-outside-the-chinese-embassy/>
- 7 Jardine, B. (2019, October 16). Why are there anti-China protests in Central Asia? The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/16/why-are-there-anti-china-protests-central-asia/>.
- 8 RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service. (2018, December 20). Bishkek Protesters Rally Outside Chinese Embassy Against 'Re-education Camps'. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/bishkek-protesters-rally-outside-chinese-embassy-against-reeducation-camps-/29667706.html>.
- 9 BBC News. (2016, April 28). Kazakhstan's land reform protests explained. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103>.
- 10 Jardine, B. (2019, October 16). Why are there anti-China protests in Central Asia? The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/16/why-are-there-anti-china-protests-central-asia/>.
- 11 Van der Kley, D. (2020, October 2). COVID and the new debt dynamics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Eurasianet. Retrieved from <https://eurasianet.org/covid-and-the-new-debt-dynamics-of-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan>.
- 12 CABAR.asia. (2020, January 14). What is the danger of Tajikistan's debt pit? Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Retrieved from <https://cabar.asia/en/what-is-the-danger-of-tajikistan-s-debt-pit>.
- 13 Karibayeva, A. (2020, May 11). Public Attitudes Toward China in Central Asia. Caspian Policy Center. Retrieved from <https://www.caspianpolicy.org/special-report-public-attitudes-toward-china-in-central-asia/>
- 14 Jardine, B. (2019, October 16). Why are there anti-China protests in Central Asia? The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/16/why-are-there-anti-china-protests-central-asia/>.
- 15 Peyrouse, S. (2016, January). Discussing China: Sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia. *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7(1), 14-23. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2015.10.003>
- 16 Yonhap. (2021, March 15). S. Korea estimated to have ranked 10th in 2020 global GDP rankings. Yonhap News Agency. Retrieved from <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210315001000320>.
- 17 Yonhap. (2021, March 15). S. Korea estimated to have ranked 10th in 2020 global GDP rankings. Yonhap News Agency. Retrieved from <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210315001000320>.
- 18 Yonhap. (2021, March 9). OECD revises up its 2021 growth outlook for S. Korean economy to 3.3 percent. The Korea Herald. Retrieved from <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210309001046#:~:text=The%20IMF%20expected%20the%20South,estimate%20stood%20at%203.2%20percent>.
- 19 Vince Kim, M. The Koreans of Kazakhstan. The Story Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.thestoryinstitute.com/the-koreans-of-kazakhstan#:~:text=THE%20KOREANS%20OF%20KAZAKHSTAN%20tells,Asia%20under%20Stalin%27s%20ethnic%20cleansing..>
- 20 Iakupbaeva, Z. (2019, August 28). Central Asia's Koreans in Korea: There and (Mostly) Back Again. Open Democracy. Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/central-asias-koreans-in-korea-there-and-mostly-back-again/>.
- 21 Matusevich, Y. (2019, May 17). From Samarkand to Seoul: Central Asian migrants in South Korea. Eurasianet.

Retrieved from <https://eurasianet.org/from-samarkand-to-seoul-central-asian-migrants-in-south-korea>.

22 Iakupbaeva, Z. (2014, September 22). Central Asia and South Korea Are More Connected Than You Might Think. *Global Voices*. Retrieved from <https://globalvoices.org/2014/09/22/central-asia-and-south-korea-more-connected-than-you-might-think/>.

23 Nikolova, M. (2021, January 22). South Korea is becoming a real alternative to Russia and China in Central Asia. *Emerging Europe*. Retrieved from <https://emerging-europe.com/news/south-korea-is-becoming-a-real-alternative-to-russia-and-china-in-central-asia/>

24 Je-hae, D. (2020, February 21). Moon's New Northern Policy gaining spotlight. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved from https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/02/356_283818.html.

25 Putz, C. (2019, April 24). South Korean President Moon Travels Across Central Asia. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/south-korean-president-moon-travels-across-central-asia/>

26 Moon, J. (2019, April 17). Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Joint Press Conference Following ROK-Turkmenistan Summit [Speech audio recording]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea. http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=319855&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=65&titleNm=

27 Yahoo! News. (2019, April 19). Uzbekistan, S. Korea sign deals worth \$12bn during Moon visit. *Yahoo! News*. Retrieved from https://ph.news.yahoo.com/uzbekistan-korea-sign-deals-worth-12bn-during-moon-142003157--finance.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlMnNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAABA29Aem-NhGQEWGSIGd815CN3Sy6Zp-bRQ6DVD8xaJic1hrDnRujrJH1rYC_y0JdJEHRW-wriSbSjN0Yull7Tz2c3EX9ka9NUq1E9EDrOAWGlyD8VL8h2LSfV3qPmVbyNKtYDsvQp5cnvpMTaooRxlL0zJY37-aVixD-VWjx8l9Z

28 Yergaliyeva, A. (2020, October 30). Kazakh President Praises South Korea's Northern Policy Progress. *The Astana Times*. Retrieved from <https://astanatimes.com/2020/10/kazakh-president-praises-south-koreas-northern-policy-progress/>

29 Park, H. R. & Kim, M. (2019, April 24). President Moon urges opening of 'Silk Road of steel' with Central Asia. *Korea.net*. Retrieved from <https://m.korea.net/english/Government/Current-Affairs/Foreign-Affairs/view?af-fairId=845&subId=731&articleId=170473&viewId=47153>

30 UZ Daily. (2020, August 5). Uzbekistan and South Korea to continue strategic cooperation. *UZ Daily*. Retrieved from <https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/56783>

31 Kim, Y. (2015, November 15). Lotte Chemical completes gas plant in Uzbekistan. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2015/10/133_188736.html

32 Rakhimov, M. (2014, January). Central Asia and Japan: Bilateral and multilateral relations. *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5(1), 77-87

33 RDissuykov, A. (2019). "Central Asia Plus Japan" Dialogue: From Idea to Implementation. *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies* 11(1), 1-21

34 Mangi, L. (2011). The Political and Economic Strategy of Japan towards Central Asia. *American University of Central Asia*. Retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145121/The%20Political%20and%20Economic%20Strategy%20of%20Japan%20towards%20Central%20Asia.pdf>

35 Peyrouse, S. (2013, August 20). Race for Rare Earths in Central Asia. *National Geographic*. Retrieved from <https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2013/08/20/race-for-rare-earths-in-central-asia/>

36 Chao, C. & Tian, D. (2014). Disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: Communication Tactics and Grand Strategies. *University of Nebraska at Omaha Communication Faculty Publications* 85(1)

37 Dadabaev, T. (2012). The Evolution of Japanese Diplomacy towards Central Asia since the Collapse of the Soviet Union *OSCE Yearbook* 2011, pp. 441-458.

38 Dadabaev, T. (2018, August 30). Japan Attempts to Crack the Central Asian Frontier. *Asia Global Online*. Retrieved from <https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/japan-central-asia-uzbekistan-kazakhstan>

39 Clarke, M. (2015, April 9). Kazakhstan's Multi-vector Foreign Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of Great Power "Pivots"? *The Asan Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.theasanforum.org/kazakhstans-multi-vector-foreign-policy-diminishing-returns-in-an-era-of-great-power-pivots/>

40 Abi-Habib, M. (2018, June 25). How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html>

1015 15th ST NW, SUITE 380
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
202.864.6958
INFO@CASPIANPOLICY.ORG
CASPIANPOLICY.ORG

CPC



CASPIAN
POLICY
CENTER